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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

In Hayes v. Eagle-PicherIndustries, Inc.,I the Tenth Circuit
considered whether a settlement agreement was binding on dissenting members of a group of plaintiffs who had earlier "entered
into [an] . . . agreement that the majority rule would govern

acceptance of a settlement." 2 On the evening prior to the day the
trial was set, the attorneys for the plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with the defendant. This agreement was accepted by 13 of the 18 plaintiffs and on the next day "an announcement was made in open court that the majority had agreed
to settle." 3 When the trial judge asked if there were any objections
to the settlement, the dissenting members of the group failed to
respond; however, when the court reduced the settlement to a
judgment, two of the plaintiffs did object and subsequently
brought this appeal.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's acceptance of the
settlement by holding that an attorney cannot settle a case over
the "express objection of his clients." 4 The court said that an
agreement to be bound by the decision of the majority was invalid
because it is
contrary to the plain duties owed by an attorney to a client. An
agreement such as the present one which allows a case to be settled
contrary to the wishes of the client and without his approving the
terms of the settlement is opposed to the basic fundamentals of the
attorney-client relationship.'
513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id.
Id. at 893. The two plaintiffs claimed that they did not hear the judge's question,
and he subsequently entered judgment on the basis that "there was no fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct" in connection with the agreement. Id. at 893 n.1. The
defendants argued that the failure of the plaintiffs to speak when the court made its
inquiry barred them from later attempting to repudiate the agreement. The Tenth Circuit,
however, rejected this argument by applying for the first time in the Tenth Circuit the
well-established right of "litigants to set aside a compromise to which they do not agree."
Id. at 894, citing Harris v. Diamond Constr. Co., 184 Va. 711, 36 S.E.2d 573 (1946); Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d 957 (1953).
513 F.2d at 894.
Id. While the agreement to be bound by the majority in a settlement was entered
into prior to the actual settlement, the court did not see how this would make the agree-
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The court questioned the propriety of such an agreement because
it placed the attorney in the posture of representing "both the
clients who favored the settlement and those who opposed it."'
In Fullmer v. Harper7 and Redd v. Shell Oil Co.,8 the court
of appeals considered the proper procedure for the disqualification of an attorney. In Fullmer the defendants filed a verified
motion to disqualify one of the plaintiff's attorneys on the
grounds that a conflict of interests existed because of a prior
attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the defendant. The motion was dismissed even though the "relationship
pertained to the general subject matter out of which the . . .
controversy had arisen," and the defendants appealed the dismissal While the Tenth Circuit was unable to decide whether a
conflict of interests existed because of the inadequacy of the record before the court, it did lay down the procedure it thought the
trial court should follow when presented with a motion to disqualify:
In our view the verified motion to disqualify raises ethical questions that are conceivably of a serious nature. In such circumstance
a written response should be required. The trial court should then
hold a full evidentiary hearing on the issues posed by the motion to
disqualify and the response thereto, which hearing should include
the taking of testimony. A motion of this type should not be resolved
on the basis of mere colloquy between court and counsel. At the
conclusion of such hearing the trial court should then make specific
findings and conclusions, to the end that this court will then have a
ment effective because "the plaintiffs would [still] have the right to agree or refuse to
agree once the terms of the settlement were made known to them." Id.
I Id. The court felt that this might be a violation of ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 5-106 (1971), which had been promulgated by the Kansas
Supreme Court; however, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the good faith of the attorneys
and noted that its opinion was "not to be understood as criticizing the professional conduct of the trial attorney" for the plaintiffs. 513 F.2d at 895 n.3.
7 517 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Fullmer was an action brought under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, codified in scattered sections
of Titles 28 and 29, for injunctive relief and monetary damages.
518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975). Redd was an appeal brought from an attorneydisciplinary action that arose in connection with an antitrust suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
1 517 F.2d at 21. The court also considered whether an order of a trial court denying
a motion to disqualify an attorney is an appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1970), which provides that "[t]he courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ......
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record before it which will permit a meaningful review, should review be sought.10

Less than 2 months later a similar problem arose in Redd v.
Shell Oil Co." The trial judge in Redd imposed a $5,000 fine on
defendant's attorney for filing what the trial court considered "a
meritless and untimely motion for disqualification of all of [the
plaintiff's] counsel."'" The basis for the motion was the fact that
an attorney who had previously worked for the firm representing
the defendant was employed by plaintiff's counsel and was involved in the case at bar. While the defendant apparently knew
of this fact for several months prior to the actual filing of the
motion, it delayed "the filing of the motion until the Friday before the Monday on which the trial was to commence."' 3 Because
the attorney who had earlier worked for the defendant had never
done any work related to the present litigation and because the
motion to disqualify was delayed until the eve of the trial, the
district court held the filing of the motion "constituted a sham
and justified the imposition of sanctions" in the form of a $5,000
fine."
The court of appeals reversed the imposition of the fine on
the basis that it was "wholly unjustified" and because it "was not
a correct measure of the action."'" Instead, "it would have been
amply sufficient to strike the motion to disqualify and to have
reprimanded counsel for having filed it at the eleventh hour."' 6
517 F.2d at 20-21.
518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 518 F.2d at 312. A problem similar to that in Redd arose in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In that case a
law clerk, employed in the litigation department of the attorneys for the defendant and
involved in work concerning the defendants, subsequently formed his own firm that then
became involved in litigation with the defendant. The trial court, in an opinion reported
at 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), denied the motion to disqualify, and this decision
was affirmed by the Second Circuit in an opinion which primarily recognized the appealability of the denial of such motions. In its opinion the Second Circuit recognized the
likelihood that such problems would continue to arise because of changes in the "structures of large metropolitan law firms," and it predicted that "[c]harges of conflict of

interest and motions to disqualify will probably increase rather than abate." 496 F.2d at
803. In its opinion the Tenth Circuit noted that similar problems had recently arisen in
other cases in Arizona.
IS 518 F.2d at 314.
' Id. at 312.
' Id. at 314.
I /d.
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The court of appeals noted that "lawyer conflict of interest problems ought to be brought up long before the date of trial in an
atmosphere which does not cast a shadow over the trial itself, ' 7
and it reiterated the procedure it established for such problems
in Fuilmer.
II.

JURISDIcTION

The Tenth Circuit in May v. Supreme Court'9 rejected for
lack of jurisdiction 0 a class action challenging the imposition by
the Colorado State Supreme Court of an annual $20 fee.2 The
court held that the amount in controversy did not exceed the
jurisdictional amount of $10,000 required under section 1331 despite the plaintiffs' contention that "the amount of controversy
is not the fee of $20 but the value of their right to practice law,"
which presumably did exceed $10,000.2 In rejecting this contention, the court of appeals relied on the 1934 Supreme Court decision of Healy v. Rattal3 in which the Court said that "[tihe
,7 Id. The court pointed out that the only issue it was deciding in Redd was whether
the disciplinary action against the attorney involved was justified by the facts and circumstances of the case.
'1 The court, at 518 F.2d at 316 n.3, quoted the language from Fullmer, appearing at
517 F.2d at 20-21 and quoted supra in the text accompanying note 10. This language
describes the proper procedure that should be followed when a motion to disqualify an
attorney is made.
19508 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2631 (1975).
20 The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as section 1331], which gives district courts jurisdiction "of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000," and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)
[hereinafter cited as section 1343(3)], which gives district courts jurisdiction to "redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States."
21 COLO. R. Civ. P. 227 provides, in part, as follows:
(1) Every attorney admitted to practice in Colorado (including judges,
those admitted on a provisional or temporary basis and those admitted as
judge advocate) shall pay an annual fee of $20.00. . . .The fee shall be used
only to defray the costs of disciplinary administration and enforcement, the
costs incurred with respect to unauthorized practice matters, and the expenses incurred in the administration of this Rule. ...
(2) Any attorney who fails to timely pay the fee required under paragraph (1) above shall be summarily suspended . . ..
22 508 F.2d at 138. The basis for the plaintiffs' claim was that the plaintiffs would be
suspended under COLO. R. Civ. P. 227(2) if they did not pay the fee.
23 292 U.S. 263 (1934). In Healy an attack was made on an annual $50 fee for peddlers,
with a fine of $200 for failure to comply; the plaintiffs alleged that they met the jurisdictional amount because the value of their business was worth more than that amount. The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed and held
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disputed tax is the matter in controversy, and its value, not that
of the penalty or loss which payment of the tax would avoid,
determines the jurisdiction."24 Because the jurisdictional amount
was not met, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action.
In Richins v. Industrial Construction, Inc.25 the State Road
Commission of Utah argued that the eleventh amendment precluded an indemnity action brought against it, and the plaintiff
countered this by pointing to the existence of a Utah statute
waiving immunity for suits brought in the state court" and the
State's appearance in court." The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
road commission that the facts pointed to by the plaintiff did not
constitute an "implied waiver" of immunity and that the action
was therefore barred." In so ruling the court of appeals noted that
it had a marked "preference for an approach giving full effect to
the Eleventh Amendment absent some extraordinarywaiver" of
immunity.2 By expressing this preference, the Tenth Circuit is
consonant both with its own precedent, 0 recent Supreme Court
that the total amount of the tax demanded, or which may be demanded...
is less than the jurisdictional amount . . . . [Therefore, the] decree will be
reversed, with instructions to the district court to dismiss the cause for want
of jurisdiction.
Id. at 272.
24 Id. at 269. This holding has been consistently followed by later courts considering
similar issues. See, e.g., Suther v. Mayfield, 358 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1966); Jacobs v. Tawes,
250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957); Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky.
1962); Brown v. Graham, 169 F. Supp. 397 (D. Ore. 1959); Southern Fruit Co. v. Porter,
21 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.S.C. 1937).
25 502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974).
26 Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (1953).
Section 63-30-16 provides for the waiver of immunity in state district courts and has been
previously interpreted by the Tenth Circuit as lacking the "clear intent" necessary to
waive immunity in the federal district courts. Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
" The Tenth Circuit, however, resolved the question of whether a waiver of the
immunity conferred by the eleventh amendment can be effected "by the attorney general
of the state entering an appearance and litigating in the case" by saying that "[wie are
of the opinion that it cannot be so waived." 502 F.2d at 1056. Accord, Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276-77 (1959); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
2" 502 F.2d at 1056. But see Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. BiState Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
502 F.2d at 1056 (emphasis added), citing Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th
Cir. 1971).
" Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Williams v.
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opinions," and a growing tendency among the circuits to find
32
against a waiver of immunity by a state.
In Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States33 the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's determination that it did not have
jurisdiction to decide a controversy under the Indian Civil Rights
Act.34 The plaintiff claimed a right of access to its property, upon
which it had built "a stopping off place for persons entering wilderness areas" from the main road.35 The access was a 31/2 mile
dirt road which crossed "Indian properties held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of individual Indians and the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes. 38 When the lodge was built the plaintiff was aware that it did not have a right of access and it was
advised that it should obtain a formal right-of-way to insure its
right of ingress and egress. Apparently the plaintiff viewed the
lack of an assured right-of-way as "no problem"; however, on the
day the lodge was opened to the public, the individual Indians
owning the property as well as "members of the . . . Joint Business Council of the tribes . . . erected a barricade across the road
3
and stopped traffic in both directions.
Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges,
356 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1966). See also Gallagher v. Continental Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827
(10th Cir. 1974).
3, Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-74 (1974), and Employees of Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293-99
(1973), with Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964), and Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276-77 (1959). See also the dissent of Justice
Frankfurter in Petty which evinces a reluctance to find a waiver of the immunity conferred
by the eleventh amendment similar to that shown by the Tenth Circuit in Richins.
32 See, e.g., Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191, 1193-96 (4th Cir. 1973); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 483 F.2d 294, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1973); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
411 U.S. 279 (1973); McDonald v. Board of Regents, 371 F.2d 818, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1967);
Scott v. Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1964). Cf. Aerojet-General Corp.
v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 826-28 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra, Pennsylvania Environmental
Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 625 (3d Cir. 1971) (dicta); Ladue Local Lines, Inc.
v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 136 (8th Cir. 1970).
- 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
3425 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) which, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.
(Emphasis added).
11515 F.2d at 929.
36 Id.
37 Id.

1976
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The plaintiff filed a complaint in which it named as defendants "the Secretary of the Interior, the area director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the superintendent of the Reservation,
. . . the Indian tribes together with the Joint Business Council
of the tribes and its individual members," and the individual
Indians owning the property.3 8 The trial court initially issued an
order restraining maintenance of the barricade, but then "denied
the application for permanent injunction" and then "without further notice . . . proceeded to dismiss the cause of action. ' 39 On
appeal, the plaintiff challenged the propriety of the trial court's
issuing "what amounted to a summary judgment without giving
the requisite notice" and the correctness of its determination that
it lacked jurisdiction. 0
The court of appeals first considered the trial court's dismissal of the United States and its officers as parties to the action.4 Because the United States had "neither expressly nor impliedly consented to the suit" it was not a proper party to the
action and its dismissal was correct. 2 The appeals court similarly
affirmed the district court's ruling that the claims brought
against the individual officers could not be sustained under section 1983, 1 because there was no showing that the defendants had
acted under color of state law.44 The Tenth Circuit did, however,
reverse the trial court's determination that there was no jurisdiction under section 1985, which prevents a denial of equal protection of the laws and does not require a showing of state action.45
The basis for the denial of equal protection and due process was
" Id. For a discussion of the propriety of the inclusion of the Government officials in
the action, see text accompanying notes 41-51 infra; for a discussion of the propriety of
the inclusion of the Indian tribes, see text accompanying notes 52-61 infra.
:9 515 F.2d at 929.

0 Id.
Id. at 930-32.
The court said, "The law is well settled that waiver of sovereign immunity is to be
strictly consirued, and it is plain that Congress did not give its consent to suits against it
by private individuals seeking private roads." Id. at 930.
,3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
" See, e.g., Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959); Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F. Supp. 1194 (D.S.D.
1975); Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F.
Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970). The court said that in section 1985 actions "the presence
or absence of state action is not a factor, for this provision embraces private conspiracies."
515 F.2d at 931, citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
42
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the plaintiff's allegation that it was made an "object of discrimination" as a result of the blockade. While "the complaint [did]
not detail the factual basis for the claim," there was a sufficient
basis in this allegation to have jurisdiction to consider the question.4 7 There was, moreover, another basis for the trial court's
jurisdiction under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents.4"
Bivens established the "constitutional tort" doctrine," and the
Tenth Circuit held that both Bivens and Bell v. Hood 0 "recognize
that the federal jurisdiction requirement is satisfied by allegations in the complaint, even though not specific, which describe
the violation of constitutional rights."5' Thus, it was improper for
the trial court to dismiss the actions against the officers of the
United States because the claims did make sufficient allegations
to justify the court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit then considered whether the dismissal of
the claims against the tribes, the Joint Business Council, and its
agents was proper."2 To resolve this question, the Tenth Circuit
had to determine whether the Indian Civil Rights Act provided
jurisdiction which would enable the federal district court to consider the instant case. The issue had been before the court earlier,
but had not been resolved because the plaintiffs in the other
actions had not presented sufficient jurisdictional facts53 or had
failed to exhaust tribal remedies. In Dry Creek Lodge the court
noted that "a decision on the question [was] unavoidable, because of the case's procedural posture" 5 and held that:
[W]e are of the opinion that 25 U.S.C. § 1302 [the Indian Civil
Rights Act], which recognizes the right to be protected against dep,e 515 F.2d at 931. For the court's description of the adequacy of the claim presented
in this case, see text accompanying note 57 infra.
,1 515 F.2d at 931.
, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
' For a discussion of this doctrine, see Horlbeck & Harkness, Executive Immunity
and the Constitutional Tort, 51 DENVER L.J. 321 (1974).
10327 U.S. 678 (1946).

515 F.2d at 931; see id. at 932 n.4.
"

Id. at 932-36.

Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971); Groundhog v.
Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974).
" 515 F.2d at 933 n.7. See also Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S.
41 (1938); see McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 20.02 (1970).
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rivation of due process and equal protection of the law furnishes a
jurisdictional basis which justifies the federal court's entertaining of
the case. . . . [In view of the legislative history [of the Indian
Civil Rights Act], it applies to non-Indians as well as Indians who
are under the jurisdiction of the tribe.5

Even though the instant case was "not the strongest case imaginable under the Indian Civil Rights Act," the allegations were
sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction.5 7 The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Dry Creek Lodge seems a reasonable interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The legislative history indicates, as the court pointed out, that the Act "was intended to
establish rights for all persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal governments." 8 This interpretation, moreover, is
similar to that given to the Act by the Eighth Circuit"9 and by two
district courts 0 which have considered the question."
In Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co."2 the Tenth
Circuit reversed a district court's declaratory judgment on the
basis that no jurisdiction existed because no case or controversy
was present. The action was initiated by the State of New Mexico
and sought "a judgment declaring that the State has certain
jurisdiction over the Sangre de Cristo Development Company
and its activities under a 99-year lease granted it in 1970 by the
Pueblo de Tesuque, an Indian Tribe." 3 The district court granted
the judgment despite the contentions of the defendants that "the
State of New Mexico is without any jurisdiction whatsoever over
the property . . . inasmuch as the lease and/or subleases cover
lands owned by the Pueblo de Tesuque."1 The Tenth Circuit
reversed the judgment on the basis that no case or controversy
5' 515 F.2d at 933.
5 Id. at 934.

Id. at 934 n.8.
Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
Hickey v. Crow Creek Housing Authority, 379 F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.D. 1974); Dodge
v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
" The defendants also alleged that the Indian tribes and its members were protected
by the same governmental immunity which shielded the United States and its officers.
The court rejected this argument by holding that section 1302 of the Indian Civil Rights
Act is a "waiver by Congress of this immunity." 515 F.2d at 934.
62 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975).
11 Id. at 371.
SI Id. at 375.
g

"
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presently existed. In an earlier decision, Davis v. Morton, 5 which
applied to the same lease, the Tenth Circuit had held that "the
subject lease did involve major federal action requiring compliance with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)
mandates."" The subject lease had at the time of the decision not
conformed to the requirements of NEPA, and it was, therefore,
"speculative when or conceivably whether it shall meet NEPA
requirements." 7 The declaratory action was improper because
"ongoing activity [might] radically change the factual situation. 6 8 The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's declaratory
judgment and left the question as to the State of New Mexico's
jurisdiction over Indian lands within it to be decided at a later
time.

11.
A.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 23 Class Actions
1.

Sanderson v. Winner 9

Class plaintiffs brought an antitrust action against various
Nissan corporations and dealerships. A demand for production of
documents filed by defendants requested of the plaintiffs personal financial information reflecting their ability to finance the
expenses of a class action. Additionally, the defendants requested
plaintiffs' fee arrangements with their attorneys on the grounds
that attorneys' fees were requested in the action. The trial court
ruled that the documents were relevant to the appropriateness of
the class action and whether plaintiffs were worthy representatives of the class. Interlocutory appeal was denied. The Tenth
Circuit held that a writ of mandamus was appropriate under the
circumstances" and that the trial court's decision allowing such
I5 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). The court in Norvell pointed out that this decision
had not been rendered at the time these proceedings were taking place before the district
court. 519 F.2d at 372.
l'519 F.2d at 372.
Id. at 375.
IId. at 378.
II
507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974).
70 The Tenth Circuit noted mandamus was not to be used as a substitute for an
appeal, but recognized it might be used in some instances to review an interlocutory order.
The court found the writ appropriate here because the case fell within the standards
recognized by other cases. Id. at 479.
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discovery was an unwarranted extension of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin.7'
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a court must be satisfied that plaintiffs could pay the notice costs and that due process
required decent notice.7" However, the Tenth Circuit held that
there was nothing in Eisen which called for unlimited inquiry into
the financial capacity of the plaintiff in regard to the question as
to whether a class action was to be allowed.73 Additionally,
defendants did not have the right to inquire whether plaintiffs
would be able to pay their lawyers or a judgment for costs.74 Thus,
since the documents sought were irrelevant, the court did not
consider the question of privilege.75
2.

Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co."8

The three plaintiffs were purchasers of beet sugar from
defendant-sellers. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the propriety
of the lower court's order that, because of a lack of commonality
of interest and a conflict of interest within the class, the claims
based on a tying arrangement and price discrimination should
not be maintained as a class action.77 The pricing policy followed
11417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen, which was a class action brought on behalf of odd-lot
traders against brokerage firms for alleged violations of antitrust and securities laws, held
that in a class action individual notice to identifiable class members cannot be waived or
reduced in a particular case. The Court further held that the plaintiff bringing the class
action must bear the cost of the notice and said as follows: "Where, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversarial, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice
as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit." Id. at 178-79.
72 Lower court decisions have considered the plaintiff's ability to pay as relevant. See
P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The Tenth Circuit distinguished these cases
on the grounds that the plaintiffs in P.D.Q. Inc. and Ralston sought to represent a class
of all new car purchasers in the United States, and size and manageability of the class
were not problems in the instant case. 507 F.2d at 480.
11 507 F.2d at 479. Additionally the court noted that oppressive discovery should not
be used to discourage private litigation which may advance an important interest of the
government. Id. at 480.
",Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 [all references to rules in this section are to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated]. Rule 69 will provide an
opportunity for discovery if judgment is obtained. See Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp.
v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Gangemi v,Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19 (D. Del.
1967). These cases suggest that there is no right to discovery of assets until judgment is
obtained. 507 F.2d at 480.
" The court noted that the attorney-client fee arrangement may not be privileged.
The cases split depending on the facts. 507 F.2d at 480.
" 503 F.2d 459 (10th'Cir. 1974).
" Rule 23(a)(3), (b)(3).
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by defendant-sellers was to meet the price of cane sugar in any
locality. The formula used in arriving at the price charged for beet
sugar was based on: (1) The price charged by the cane sugar
refinery in California, and (2) the cost of shipping the cane sugar
from California to particular zones within the complaint area.
Plaintiffs argued that the cost of shipping in the beet sugar pricing formula invariably exceeded the actual cost of transportation
from the beet sugar refinery to the buyer-plaintiff."
The Tenth Circuit upheld the reasoning of the trial court
that, if the plaintiffs were successful on these claims, defendants
would be enjoined from using their formula pricing method and
would have to give recognition to actual freight costs. The result
would be that a plaintiff closer to the beet plant would pay less
for beet sugar than a plaintiff further away. Thus, a conflict of
price paid would result between plaintiffs, and their competitive
positions would be disrupted.7 9 The Tenth Circuit stated that "a
plaintiff cannot maintain a class action when his interests are
antagonistic to, or in conflict with the interests of the persons he
would seek to represent."8 The Tenth Circuit recognized that
disparity in benefit will not preclude a class action; but in this
case the competitive positions would be changed among the
plaintiffs, thus producing the lack of the required commonality
of interest among the class members. However, the plaintiffs'
claims based on conspiracy and attempt to monopolize could
proceed as class actions because any relief would not affect the
pricing system of the defendants. 8
2
3. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co.1
On February 28, 1973 the trial court approved class status for
all Oklahoma public bodies and denied class status to the Oklahoma private contractors in an antitrust suit against certain liquid asphalt sellers. Between April 9th and 13th the private contractors sought to intervene as co-plaintiffs, and the trial court
held that the intervention was barred by the statute of limitations.
"

503 F.2d at 462.
IId. at 463-64.
Id. at 463, citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp.,

419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970).
" 503 F.2d at 464.
.2 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
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The first issue facing the Tenth Circuit was the reviewability
of an order denying class status. The court noted the general rule
that "an order denying class status is interlocutory and not appealable. 8 3 When the trial court entered a final judgment against
the intervenors, the interlocutory order denying class status
merged into the final judgment and thus became reviewable.8 4
The intervenors further challenged the district court's denial of
certification. The appellate court noted that "[c]lass certification is discretionary with the trial judge" and found no abuse of
discretion. 5 Because a class may be divided into subclasses," the
trial court was justified in its discretionary creation of two subclasses in that the interests of the public and private bodies were
divergent. 7
However, each subclass must meet the requirements of rule
23(a) and (b). The private contractors did not meet either the
requirements of numerosity5 or fair and adequate representation.89 There were 37 potential Oklahoma private contractors, and
joinder was held not to be impracticable.9 ° Secondly, the court
found that the class representative was not in the road construction business, had not purchased liquid asphalt for 4 years prior
to the suit, and, therefore, did not share a common interest with
the class members.9 '
Next, the court considered the question of the bar of the
statute of limitations on the intervention of the private contractors as coplaintiffs. Private civil antitrust suits must be commId. at 1076-77.
Id. at 1077, citing Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390, 392 (10th Cir.
1956); Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 671-72 (10th Cir. 1944). The court noted that they
could find no cases specifically on the question of whether after denial of class status and
intervention, the class status denied could be raised as error on appeal from denial of
intervention. 511 F.2d at 1077.
" The same issue was raised in Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 523 F.2d 1 (10th
Cir. 1975). The court in a rehearing en banc determined that although the trial judge had
expressed a conclusion that the case be considered a class action, the findings as to the
elements of a class action required by rule 23 were not made. Neither proper procedure
nor proper sequence was followed. The case was remanded to the trial court.
" Rule 23(c)(4)(B).
'7 511 F.2d at 1077.
'
Rule 23(a)(1).
g Rule 23(a)(4).
'0 511 F.2d at 1077.
'

Id.
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enced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued." If an
action is brought by the United States, the statute of limitations
for private antitrust actions is suspended during the pendency of
the federal suit and for 1 year thereafter. However, a private
action must be brought within the period of suspension plus 1
year or within 4 years after the cause of action accrued, or it will
be barred. 3
In resolving whether the private contractors could intervene
or were barred by the statute of limitations, the court relied upon
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.94 When American
Pipe was filed, 11 days remained of the suspension period. This
period was tolled during the time the court considered the question of maintenance of the class action. Interventions filed 8 days
after the denial of class status were upheld in American Pipe;
however, in Monarch the suspension period resulting from the
federal action 5 ended on November 6, 1971. The original complaint in this case was filed on October 12, 1971. The suspension
period was tolled during consideration of the class status of the
parties. When class status was denied the contractors on February 28, 1973, there were 26 days left in the suspension period. The
private contractors failed to file their petition to intervene until
April 9, 1973, and thus were barred by the statute of limitations.
Other arguments put forth by the private contractors were
rejected by the Tenth Circuit. Even though the February 28th
order allowed the contractors 45 days in which to intervene, the
Tenth Circuit held that it is necessary to adhere strictly to the
statute of limitations. The court did not allow motions for a new
trial, motions to amend the February 28th order under rule 59(a)
and (e), or an oral motion to amend the February 28th order to
toll the suspension period. 7 Finally, the court held that interven15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
" Id. § 16(b).
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
United States v. Wilshire Oil Co., 427 F.2d 969 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
829 (1970). Certiorari was denied on October 12, 1970. Under Supreme Court rule 58, the
petitioners had 25 days to file a petition for rehearing. Even if none were filed, the case
would remain pending in the Supreme Court for those 25 days. 511 F.2d at 1078.
" 511 F.2d at 1079, citing Kavanagh v. Nobel, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that rule 59 applied to new trials and amendments of
judgments and the February 28th order was interlocutory and not appealable. The court
stated: "Although Rule 59 motions may extend the time for appeal from judgments and
92
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tion into a certified class action suit does not automatically relate
back to the date on which the original action was filed. 8
4.

Seiffer v. Topsy's International,Inc."

Defendants appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 from a judgment certifying a class action in a federal securities fraud suit.00
The Tenth Circuit held the order was not appealable under section 1291 and the order could only be reviewed upon final judgment on the merits. The Tenth Circuit noted its reluctance to
review a denial or grant of class status because the order may be
amended as the trial proceeds.' The Tenth Circuit indicated its
approval of the Second and Third Circuits' post-Eisen threepronged tests for section 1291 appealability.' Considerations are
to be: (1) Whether the class action determination is fundamental
to the further disposition of the case and not merely a provisional
disposition of an issue; (2) whether review of the order is separable from the merits; and (3) whether rights would be irreparably
lost and irreparable harm, in terms of time and money, would be
caused if review were postponed until final disposition of the case.
Applying the above considerations to the instant case, the
Tenth Circuit denied review. Whether 4700 potential class members were included or not, the plaintiffs could pursue the suit even
if class status were denied. Thus, no irreparable harm was done
to the defendants. The determination of the class was not collateral to a final decision on the merits, and proof of due diligence
would be an integral part of the suit whether brought individually
or as a class.'03
appealable orders, see F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a), they do not stay interlocutory orders or toll the
running of a limitation period." 511 F.2d at 1079.
" The court noted that this had been allowed under the old rule 23 which did not
control in this case. 511 F.2d at 1079.
520 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1975).
The appellants argued that a standard of due diligence in discovering the fraud
should be required of each class member, thus making the class unmanageable. The trial
court held, however, that an objective standard of whether the reasonable investor would
have discovered the fraud was the test. Thus, common questions of law and fact predominated, and the class was manageable. Id. at 796.
" The Tenth Circuit relied upon Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),
which approved a grant of review when the matter concerned final disposition of a claimed
right but was not a review on the merits. In the instant case the issue sought to be reviewed
went to the merits-that is, whether the class was properly certified. 520 F.2d at 797.
'" 520 F.2d at 797-98, citing Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 159
(3d Cir. 1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1974).
" 520 F.2d at 798.
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Appealability: R.D. Andersen Construction Co. v. Iron

Workers Local

101104

In this opinion the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of
a timely appeal. 0 5 The appellant argued that his appeal was
timely' because the trial court granted an extension of time,
until 15 days after receipt of the trial transcript, in which to file
post-trial motions. However, the Tenth Circuit held that because
there must be a definite point at which judgment is final, rule 6107
allowed no enlargement of time for the exercise of rights under
rules 50(b) °5 and 59(b). 0 1 Appellant also contended that his orally made motion for a directed verdict did not need to be reduced
to writing within the 10-day limit of rule 50(b). However, the
Tenth Circuit interpreted rule 50(b) as requiring a written motion
within 10 days after judgment when the oral motion is not
granted." 0
No. 75-1298 (10th Cir., July 1, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
IO5

The Tenth Circuit considered the timeliness of appeal in two other cases: Q-Panel

Co. v. Newfield, No. 74-1039 (10th Cir., Jan. 3, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication) and
Lovell v. Saxbe, No. 75-1167 (10th Cir., July 23, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication). In
Q-Panel an appeal from a bill of costs a month after the ruling by the clerk asserted that
the ruling dealt with "expenses" as distinguished from the costs portion. The Tenth
Circuit held that rule 54(d) requires that this review of the clerk's action must be requested within 5 days and this review was, therefore, not timely. In Lovell the Tenth
Circuit held that rule 60(b) does not extend the time for taking an appeal and does not
affect the finality of a judgment.
'01 If there are no timely post-trial motions filed, appellant has 30 days to file a notice
of appeal as required by FED. R. App. P. 4. Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 311 (1974). See Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J.
227, 228 n.16 (1975).
101Rule 6(b)(2) provides for enlargement "upon motion made after the expiration of
the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time" for rules 50(b) and 59(b).
"I' Rule 50(b) concerns motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It provides that "[n]ot later than 10 days after entry of judgment, a party
who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside .
See Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 227, 229-30
(1975).
101Rule 59(b) provides: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after the entry of the judgment . ... "
11*In Berry v. Cimmarron Ins. Co., No. 74-1129 (10th Cir., Dec. 20, 1974) (Not for
Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit considered the effect of the failure to move for a
directed verdict. The court held that where a defendant fails to move for a directed verdict
at the close of all the evidence, he may not thereafter challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal, in a motion for a new trial, or in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As support for this, the court cited Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie
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C. Rule 13 Compulsory Counterclaims: Pipeliners Local 798 v.
Ellerd'"
Plaintiffs filed a civil rights action arising out of physical
violence at a construction site concerning the hiring of union
labor. Defendants answered, stating that plaintiffs violated the
Colorado Labor Peace Act, and counterclaimed alleging that
plaintiffs' actions had caused damage to the defendants including
expenses for the protection of labor and material, the replacement of 12 workers frightened by the union's threats, and the loss
of 2 days' production at the site."' All parties agreed in open court
to a stipulation dismissing the complaint with prejudice and all
parties agreed that defendants' counterclaim survived.
Appellants contended that, because the complaint had been
dismissed and the counterclaim was permissive, the counterclaim
must fail for lack of an independent basis of jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit noted the standards used to determine the compulsory or permissive nature of a counterclaim:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit
on defendants' claim absent the compulsory counterclaims rule? 3.
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs'
Co., 349 F.2d 122, 156 (10th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Poland, 325 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1963);
Southern Ry. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1960).
503 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1974).
1

Plaintiffs contended the trial court abused its discretion in admitting exhibits

relating to expenses incurred by defendants resulting from the encounter on the job site
as business records and, thus, an exception to the hearsay rule. The Tenth Circuit held
that these were records kept in the ordinary course of business and that they were within
the personal knowledge of the witness. Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1973);

United States v. Sparrow, 470 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
503 F.2d at 1200-01.
Second, the appellants argued that, since the defendants relied on a violation of the
Colorado Labor Peace Act in their counterclaim, they must first exhaust administrative
remedies. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendants had a right to an independent
remedy, citing with approval, Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo.
187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955), which reasoned that the damages as a result of an illegal act are
based in tort and, thus, a common law action for damages is valid. 503 F.2d at 1201. See
generally note 93 supra.
Third, plaintiffs objected to damages recovered for "loss of efficiency" on the job
because of the lack of substantive evidence on the point. However, the Tenth Circuit found
that the "loss of efficiency" was based on expert estimates of the damages in turn based
on facts established at trial, and recovery would not be denied because damages could not
be specifically measured. The court cited Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1973);
A to Z Rental, Inc. v. Wilson, 413 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1969). 503 F.2d at 1201-02.
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claim as well as defendants' counterclaim? 4. Is there
any logical
3
relation between the claim and the counterclaim?"

The court stated that the "logical relation test" was the most
important of the standards; 4 that is, the principal claim and the
counterclaim logically relate to each other because of their common origin. Rule 13(a) states that a claim is compulsory and must
be pleaded if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.""' 5 The Tenth
Circuit noted that "transaction" and "occurrence" should be construed liberally," 6 and held the defendants' counterclaim was
compulsory." 7
Concerning jurisdiction, the court held a permissive counterclaim not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence must
have its own base of jurisdiction. However, a compulsory counterclaim derives its jurisdiction from the principal suit;"' thus, a
federal court may assert jurisdiction over the claim even though
it might not have jurisdiction if it were an independent proceeding."' The Tenth Circuit stated that it was settled law that a
court has ancillary jurisdiction even if the plaintiff's claim is
dismissed as in the instant case.2 0
D. Rule 19 Indispensable Parties:State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.''
Lance Garton rented a car from Budget-Rent-A-Car and subsequently became involved in a traffic accident injuring a passen"'

503 F.2d at 1198.

"' Id. at 1199.

But see rule 13(b).
...503 F.2d at 1199.
"7 Judge Breitenstein, who wrote a concurring opinion, did not wish the majority's
"

opinion to be viewed as general approval of counterclaims in civil rights actions. Moreover,
the "transaction or occurrence" requirement of rule 13(a) should have been determined
by the trial court and not de novo by the court of appeals; however, in the instant case
plaintiffs failed to object to the counterclaim at the trial court level, and, therefore, Judge
Breitenstein concurred with the majority that the counterclaim should stand. Id. at 1202.
"I Id. at 1198, citing United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954), and

quoting Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 944 (1956).
"' Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956).
", Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Kirby v. American Soda
Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141 (1904).
" 518 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1975).
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ger in another car, Carol Ammerman. Ammerman instituted a
tort suit, claiming $481,200 in damages. A dispute arose between
Budget's insurance carrier, Mid-Continent Casualty, and Garton's carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, as to
who was the primary carrier and thus had the responsibility of
defending the tort suit. In an action for declaratory judgment'22
the trial court determined that Mid-Continent was the primary
carrier.
Mid-Continent appealed,' 3 contending that the absence of
Garton as a party to the litigation was error'2 4 because he was an
indispensable party.'2 5 An indispensable litigant must first qualify as a conditionally necessary party under one of the options of
19(a) before his indispensability can be determined under 19(b).
Concerning 19(a)(1),'16 complete declaratory relief was accorded
the parties and, thus, Garton was not a necessary party. Next, the
court concluded that Garton met the threshold requirement of
19(a)(2); that is, he possessed an interest relating to the subject
matter of the action. Because of the amount of the tort claim and
the existence of two insurance 27policies, Garton had an interest in
securing maximum coverage.'
'2 28 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1970).
'2 Id. Section 2201 provides as follows: "Any such declaration shall have the force

and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
,21Rule 12(h)(2). The defense of failure to join an indispensable party may be made
at any time.
" Rule 19 provides as follows:
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service
of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1)
in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person
as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The court noted that it did not concern itself with whether Garton was a proper party who
may be joined. 518 F.2d at 294. See also Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 227 (1974).
' See note 196 supra.
'12 The court did not recognize the interest of the insured in the right to the defense
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In addition, however, Garton had to meet the requirements
of 19(a)(2)(i) and 19(a)(2)(ii).15 The declaratory judgment was
not res judicata as to Garton, so 19(a)(2)(i) did -not make Garton
a necessary party as he could relitigate the matter on his own
behalf. 2 9 Because there was no substantial risk of inconsistent
obligations arising from possible subsequent litigation,
19(a)(2)(ii) also required classifying Garton as a necessary
party. 3 The court reasoned that subsequent litigation could not
result in judgments against the insurance carriers beyond their
policy limits. Second, litigation on Garton's part after a determination of primary and excess coverage was unlikely. However, if
one company was held to provide all the coverage and the tort
claim was in excess of that, there was a possibility of litigation
by Garton against the other insurer with the possible result of
inconsistent obligations. However, the Tenth Circuit noted:
We, like the trial court, are required to look to "practical possibilities more than theoretical possibilities" in considering possible prejudice to parties.' 31

The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Garton had shown no interest
in the litigation, and any tort judgment would likely be within the
sole insurer's limits.
Appellant further argued that the trial court should have
exercised its discretion and not granted declaratory relief. The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a declaratory judgment 3 2
remedy requires an actual controversy, the joinder of all interhe contracted for with his own insurer. This was not a case where the insured was attempting to have its uninsured defended by an unrelated insurance company. In the instant case
Garton had contracted with both companies. The court rejected the notion that the
insurers might be subjected to unequal duties to defend, reasoning that Garton had not
sought defense from either company. 518 F.2d at 296.
"' See note 125 supra.
121 518 F.2d at 295, citing Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
416 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1969). The court distinguished the two Seventh Circuit cases,
Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1964) and
Diamond Shamrock, which held that without the insured or injured party a declaratory
judgment was only an advisory opinion. The Tenth Circuit noted that the above cases did
not consider the issue in terms of rule 19. The lack of res judicata is to be considered in a
rule 19(a)(2) and 19(b) analysis. 518 F.2d at 295-96.
"1 518 F.2d at 295.

131Id. at 295, citing 3A J.
(2d ed. 1974).
132 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).

MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACricE
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ested parties whenever possible,' 3 disposal of a controversy, and
must serve a useful purpose.' 34 However, the court had determined that all conditionally necessary and indispensable parties
were present.' 35 Moreover, even though subsequent controversies
might arise, the action disposed of the dispute as to which insurer was primary. '36 Thus, the trial court had not abused its
3 7
discretion.
Charles P. Leder
Mary M. Schwertz

60(b)(6)
Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975)
POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF UNDER RULE
By ALAN M. LOEB*
In Pierce v. Cook & Co.' the Tenth Circuit rendered a decision dealing with post-judgment relief under rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' which may have far-reaching
'1 Earlier in the opinion the court noted that "there are no special provisions detailing parties needed for a just adjudication in declaratory actions; general principles of
joinder control." 518 F.2d at 294, citing, 6A J. MOORE, supra note 131, 57.25 at 57-253.
"1 518 F.2d at 296, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 121 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark.
1954).
' See text accompanying notes 125-31 supra.
'3' Both insurance policies contained escape (i.e., no liability) clauses. 518 F.2d at
297. The court noted that, where escape clauses are mutually repugnant, the loss will be
prorated. Id., citing 16 H. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62.84 (Supp. 1974).
However, after the escape clauses cancelled each other's effectiveness, State Farm's policy
provided for excess coverage and Mid-Continent's policy provided for pro rata coverage.
The Tenth Circuit held that when one policy provides for pro rata coverage and the other
for excess coverage, the policy with the pro rata clause is the primary carrier up to the
limits of the policy, and the policy with the excess clause is liable for amounts over the
limits of the pro rata policy. 518 F.2d at 297-98, citing Thurston Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 619 (D. Okla. 1969).
" 518 F.2d at 297.

*Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1968, Stanford University; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan.
518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975).
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
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implications on the finality of all civil diversity judgments well
beyond the narrow factual setting of the Pierce case itself.
The facts in Pierce were as follows: Edwards, the owner and
driver of a tractor-trailer, was hauling wheat on an Oklahoma
highway for the defendant Cook & Co. (hereinafter Cook) when
the rig collided with a car driven by Mr. Pierce.' Pierce was killed
and two passengers in his car were injured. Pierce's wife brought
suit against Cook in an Oklahoma state court as surviving widow
of Mr. Pierce and for their minor children. Similar state court
actions were also brought against Cook by Ellenwood and Davis,
the passengers in the Pierce car. Cook removed all three cases to
the federal district court in Oklahoma on grounds of diversity of
citizenship.4 However, the Davis case was dismissed on the voluntary motion of the plaintiff and was later refiled in the Oklahoma
state court by coguardians of Davis, who was a minor. This procedural maneuver destroyed diversity of citizenship and thus kept
the Davis case in the state court.
Applying Oklahoma law, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma granted Cook summary judgment against Pierce and Ellenwood on the ground that, under
the prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Marion, Machine
Foundry & Supply Co. v. Duncan,' Cook was not liable for the

'

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and
(3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
The accident occurred on January 11, 1968.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
187 Okla. 160, 101 P.2d 813 (1940).
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tort of Edwards, who was an independent contractor. Pierce and
Ellenwood appealed, and the Tenth Circuit, concluding that
Oklahoma law controlled, affirmed.' This decision became final
in January 1971.
Similarly, in the Davis case, an Oklahoma state trial court
gave summary judgment for Cook on the basis of the Marion
decision. However, on appeal,7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
specifically overruled Marion, holding that, under some circumstances, a shipper may be held liable for the torts of an independent contractor motor carrier,8 and remanded the case for a jury
trial.' This decision became final in May 1974.
Several months after the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court became final, Pierce and Ellenwood filed a motion under
rule 60(b) directly with the Tenth Circuit seeking relief as a matter of law from the prior judgment entered against them.
Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Breitenstein,10 first held that it was appropriate for the court of
appeals to hear the motion. The court then held that extraordinary relief under rule 60(b)(6)1" appeared to be appropriate in this
case and, accordingly, vacated its prior judgment and remanded
' Pierce v. Cook & Co., 437 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1970). On appeal, Pierce and Ellenwood conceded the effect of the Marion decision, but argued that federal common law
controlled as a result of the Motion Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970). The Tenth
Circuit rejected this argument.
Hudgens v. Cook Indus., Inc., 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1974).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
Where there is foreseeable risk of harm to others unless precautions are
taken, it is the duty of one who is regularly engaged in a commercial
enterprise which involves selection of motor carriers as an integral part of the
business, to exercise reasonable care to select a competent carrier. Failure
to exercise such care may create liability on the part of the employer for the
negligence of the carrier.
Id. at 816.
The Davis case was ultimately settled without a trial.
0C518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975). There were three other opinions in addition to the
majority's. Judge Barrett wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result. Id. at 724.
Chief Judge Lewis (joined by Judge Seth) dissented. Id. at 725. And Judge Seth (joined
by Chief Judge Lewis) also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) provides in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ..
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Apparently, neither party briefed or argued the impact of rule 60(b)(6) on the issues before
the Tenth Circuit. 518 F.2d at 723.
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the case to the trial court for consideration of the plaintiffs' arguments in light of both its opinion and the recent decision of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The first interesting question raised by the Pierce decision is
whether the Tenth Circuit should have even considered the merits of the motion before it. Technically, motions under rule 60(b)
should be directed to the trial court, which then exercises its
discretion on whether or not to grant the motion on its merits.
There is no provision for a rule 60(b) motion to be filed with the
appellate court in the first instance. 3 At most, the appellate court
has the power to consider a motion for leave to file a rule 60(b)
motion in the trial court.'4 The majority opinion recognized that
the filing of a motion with the appellate court for leave to file a
rule 60(b) motion in the trial court may be unnecessary, and,
indeed, conceded that such a procedure had been previously
passed on by the Tenth Circuit in Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp. 5
12518 F.2d at 721. It is important to note that the Tenth Circuit did not set aside
the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 724. Rather, it invited the plaintiffs to file a motion
in the trial court under rule 60(b)(6), seeking relief from the summary judgment entered
against them, and directed the trial court to "consider the motion, and any response
thereto, in the light of the Hudgens opinion . . . and of this opinion and. . . make such
determination as it deems proper." Id. Chief Judge Lewis, dissenting, took the view that
the majority opinion "for all practical purposes" aborted the discretion of the trial court
through a "predecision . . . on the merits." Id. at 725.
13An interesting sidelight is that the Colorado Supreme Court, in a case arising under
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically held that it could not and would not
pass upon the merits of a rule 60(b) motion in the first instance. Olmstead v. District
Court, 157 Colo. 326, 403 P.2d 442 (1965). The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
[Elven though it might well facilitate matters for this Court to step in and
pass on the merits of these two motions, such would short circuit the judicial
process to the end that this Court would then be acting as a trial court. This
Court does not grant or deny motions filed subsequent to entry of judgment
under Rule 59 or Rule 60, R.C.P. Colo. This is a function of the trial court.
Once a trial court has acted, however, this Court may in appropriate proceedings be called upon to review the propriety of the action thus taken by
it.
Id. at 331, 403 P.2d at 444.
"dThis is the procedure suggested by Judge Seth in his dissenting opinion in Pierce.
518 F.2d at 725.
15 405 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973). The Court stated
in Wilkin:
We agree that the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the issues
presented in a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). Accordingly, we hold that
there is no necessity that a preliminary petition requesting permission be
filed with the appellate court.
405 F.2d at 166.
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Nevertheless, the majority chose not to follow Wilkin but rather
to consider the motion before it in Pierce.
The reason espoused by the majority for considering the motion was that, because its judgment was final and mandate had
been issued, "the trial court could well believe that it is without
power to determine a legal question contrary to the decision of the
court of appeals."'" Yet, it can be questioned whether this reason
is sufficient to distinguish the court's previous comments in
Wilkin and to adopt the procedure utilized in Pierce. Indeed, the
majority itself recognized that there is no time limitation for filing motions under rule 60(b)(6) with the trial court 7 other than
that the motion must be made within a "reasonable time." As
such, a trial court could feel free to consider the merits of such a
motion and allow the parties to appeal its decision to the court
of appeals if there was dissatisfaction with it.
The second and more important aspect of the Pierce decision
is the majority's ruling and comments on the substantive issue
itself-i.e., whether the petitioners presented any "reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."' 8 Citing Collins v.
City of Wichita,'9 the majority stated the applicable test to be
that "in extraordinary situations, relief from final judgments may
be had under Rule 60(b)(6), when such action is appropriate to
accomplish justice."" The issue, as defined by the majority, was
whether the Pierce case presented such an "extraordinary situation." The majority held that it did.
In the Collins case, the plaintiffs initially attacked the constitutionality of a Kansas condemnation statute and lost."2 Over
a year later, in a case unrelated to Collins, the United States
Supreme Court held the same Kansas statute unconstitutional.2 3
The plaintiffs in Collins then sought relief from the trial court by
way of a motion under rule 60(b)(6). The motion was overruled
518 F.2d at 722.
Motions pursuant to rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) must be made not more than 1
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
" 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 839.
" 518 F.2d at 723.
2 Collins v. City of Wichita, 225 F.2d 132 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 886
(1955).
' Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
"

'7
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and that decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit."4 In Collins,
the Tenth Circuit used strong language in holding that the
change in law involved there did not justify rule 60(b)(6) relief.
The court stated:
Litigation must end some time, and the fact that a court may have
made a mistake in the law when entering judgment, or that there
may have been a judicial change in the court's view of the law after
its entry, does not justify setting it aside.21

The majority in Pierce distinguished Collins by arguing that,
there the decisional change in the law came in an unrelated case,
whereas in Pierce it came in a case "arising out of the same
accident as that in which the plaintiffs now before us were injured." 2 6 It can be questioned whether this is a valid distinction.
Although Collins involved two unrelated pieces of litigation, the
constitutionality of the same Kansas statute was at issue in both.
This fact tied the two cases together just as the accident tied the
Pierce cases together.21 In the abstract, therefore, it is difficult to
accept the majority's distinction of Collins and its refusal to follow that decision.
The real basis for the majority's decision in Pierce would
appear to be its acceptance of the argument that after the plaintiffs were forced into federal court by the removal procedure on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the federal forum gave them
''substantially different treatment than that received in state
court by another injured in the same accident. 2' This result,
according to the majority, violated the "outcome determination"
principle set forth in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 2 9 It was this
combination of events which led the Tenth Circuit to conclude
that Pierce presented an "extraordinary situation" justifying relief under rule 60(b)(6).
Judges Lewis and Seth, in dissent, expressed concern that
the scope of the majority opinion was so broad that it could be
interpreted so as to create uncertainty as to the finality of any
2, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).

Id. at 839.
518 F.2d at 723.

Judge Seth, in his dissent, went so far as to state that the majority opinion effectively overruled Collins. Id. at 725.
Id. at 723.
2 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
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final judgment in any diversity case. Chief Judge Lewis "assumed" that the majority opinion was intended to be limited to
cases based on common disasters, but noted that the decision was
not precise on this point.3 0 Judge Seth opined that the "argument
advanced by the majority is equally applicable to any diversity
case." 3' In the abstract, the comments of the dissenters are welltaken, for the finality of judgments is important, and consistency
in the law, while desirable, may not be required.32 It remains to
be seen, however, whether as a practical matter the Tenth Circuit
will utilize the Pierce decision continually to uphold postjudgment relief under rule 60(b)(6) in all types of diversity cases.
In the final analysis, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Pierce
may be just a further indication of the federal judiciary's growing
dissatisfaction with diversity jurisdiction and the problems it is
creating for the federal court system.3 Diversity jurisdiction and
the removal procedure for invoking such jurisdiction have been
criticized as a significant cause of the increasingly burdensome
caseload in the federal courts, and there have been recent expres34
sions that diversity jurisdiction should be abolished altogether.
To the extent that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pierce can be
read as that court's opinion-however indirect-that substantive
state law questions should be decided by the state courts rather
than by the federal courts sitting with diversity jurisdiction, it
may serve as a warning to lawyers who practice in the Tenth
Circuit to analyze in greater detail the initial strategic decision
whether to litigate in the state or federal court systems.

"
31

518 F.2d at 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 726 (Seth, J., dissenting).
Id. at 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).

3
In this regard, Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Pierce may be the most enlightening of all four of the written opinions. Concurring in the result, Judge Barrett stated
that rule 60(b)(6)
should always be applied in order to relieve a party who did not invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal court in a diversity suit from a judgment adverse
to that which would otherwise have been favorable in the state court forums.
One who invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court when the diversity
requirements are present should pay the consequences of that election. A
change in state law should not be cause for relief to one who has voluntarily
selected that forum. Such a litigant is not entitled to the proverbial "two
bites at the apple." Furthermore, such application should do much to promote and strengthen proper Federal-State court relations.
Id. at 724 (emphasis added),
11 See, e.g., Burger, Report on the FederalJudicialBranch, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126
(1973).

